

Security Council

Kennesaw State University
High School Model United Nations 2017
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Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the thirty-first annual Kennesaw State University High School Model United Nations Conference. My name is *Brandon Vines*, and I am honored to serve as your Director for Security Council. I am the current captain of the Kennesaw Model United Nations team, and have traveled with our team to four domestic and five international conferences. I'm a senior majoring in History with a minor in Legal Studies; I've been a competitive fencer for thirteen years; and I am currently working on learning Spanish and German. I hope to pursue my J.D. in International Diplomatic Law after my time at Kennesaw.

Grecia Torres will be serving as the Assistant Director for this committee. She is currently a junior at Kennesaw State University majoring in Nursing. She seeks a career in the dermatology field in her future. She is a cat aficionado. This is her first year participating in the Security Council. *Sam Compagno* also contributed heavily to this background guide.

The United Nations Security Council (SC), like the General Assembly, is a broad body that covers a wide range of keynote issues; however the SC does have significantly more power than any other organ within the United Nations system. The topics we will cover this year are:

- I. Combating Piracy on the High Seas, and**
- II. Preventative Measures Against the Use of Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism**

There is also the distinct possibility of a crisis scenario being brought before the body without prior warning. In such a scenario, the body will be presented with reports and “experts” in related fields to facilitate debate. The crisis will be tied into current world events, so in order to perform well delegates are expected to have a working knowledge of contemporary happenings international relations. There will also be professors on hand — performing in the role of “Home Government” — who will help answer any policy questions throughout committee.

Each country delegation within this committee is expected to submit a position paper which covers both of the agenda topics. A position paper is a short essay describing your nation's history and position on the issues at hand. There are three key parts to any successful position paper: history, current status of the issue, and possible solutions. Information for properly formatting the position papers as well as valuable advice for writing a quality paper can be found in the Delegate Resource Guide. Delegates are reminded that papers should be no longer than two pages in length with titles in size 12 and text in size 10-12 Times New Roman. Citations for SC should be footnoted in Chicago style formatting (such as used inside this guide); furthermore, plagiarism in an academic setting is unacceptable and will nullify any score for the paper in question. Wikipedia is a wonderful jumping off point, but bear in mind that we will be utilizing

the university's plagiarism checker. The objective of a position paper is to present the diplomatic position of your country on both agenda topics as closely as possible to how an actual diplomat would present the position of his or her native state. When researching for your position papers and preparing for this committee, we highly encourage you to carefully read this background guide and utilize the resources we have provided for you.

There are some unique rules for the Security Council, so please read over the Addendum at the end of this document. Finally, all delegates should be prepared to operate under a Security Council perspective. This committee is unique in that it actually holds binding power over all Member States of the United Nations; therefore, all resolutions in committee may use language such as "Condemns", "Requires", "Demands", etc. Just as in the real Security Council, delegates will be expected to be able to respond to any crisis that may pertain to world security, should one arise. Research previous actions of the Security Council in crises and learn of any method that is available to you as a delegate. Due to these intense structures of the UNSC, all delegates will be held to the standard of college MUN simulations by the dais. The UNSC is the closest thing to a world government and necessitates such proficiency.

Please feel free to email us, and we look forward to meeting and working with all of you.

Brandon Vines, Director
Grecia Torres, Assistant Director
Sam Compagno, Chair

Eye of the Storm: Committee History

“The Security Council resolutions will be enforced - the just demands of peace and security will be met - or action will be unavoidable.”

-- Colin Powell, Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff

“What takes place in the Security Council more closely resembles a mugging than either a political debate or an effort at problem-solving.”

-- Jeane Kirkpatrick, 16th US Ambassador to the United Nations

The United Nations Security Council was established under Chapter V of the United Nations Charter in the wake of the Second World War; its goal was to provide a platform for meaningful diplomacy and intervention so such a terrible conflict would never again arise.¹ Throughout the War, at conferences in famous locations such as Yalta, Westminster, and Potsdam leaders from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China met to discuss plans to replace the defunct League of Nations. This representation eventually led to the formation of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The Security Council's mission was rooted in the Atlantic Charter and tempered in the fires of the Cold War. Its fifteen members (originally eleven) are headed by the five permanent members: the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Russian Federation (originally the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The remaining ten Member States of the Security Council are voted to serve two year terms by the General Assembly. Any matter of substance, in order to pass, requires both a majority vote AND the affirmative votes or abstentions of all five permanent members (P5). Any negative vote from the P5, referred to as a “veto,” instantly strikes down any resolution. The USSR/Russian Federation has used its veto power the most since the council's formation totaling 128 times, with the United States following with 83 times.² The current roster of the Security Council (sans the P5) is as follows: Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, Venezuela.

The mission of the UN Security Council is listed in Chapters VI & VII of the United Nations Charter. Simply put, its mission is to ensure peace. It is the only body with the power to act, rather than recommend. Chapter VI provides the UN Security Council with complete

¹ Charter of the United Nations (1945).

² Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council (2004).

investigative powers and privileges in situations where it feels international security could be at risk under Article 34.³ All members of the United Nations Security Council also commit their military forces to enacting “Chapter VII Actions” of the United Nations Security Council when there is a breach of peace or threat to peace.

Issues can be brought before the Security Council by any Member State. Proposing Member States can also give an opinion and advice on the topic, but cannot vote or take part in the decision making. The President of the UNSC may call a meeting at any time to react to an emerging crisis, and, therefore, Member States are required to keep a representative on call. The General Assembly may also call upon the Security Council to intervene, however as soon as a topic goes to the Security Council the General Assembly may no longer discuss it. The UNSC is called in to resolve the world’s most pressing and potentially unsettling disputes. It is the only body legally allowed to utilize military intervention (although each P5 Member State has broken this accord).

The Security Council has had much success on the world stage. It smoothed over the independence of Namibia and their decades long struggle against South Africa with UNSC Resolution 435 which stopped all military activities and facilitated Namibian independence in 1976. In the 1980s “the UN Security Council played a key role in the peace process that brought an end to the war in El Salvador;” the conflict was fully resolved in 1995.⁴ Security Council involvement in Mozambique is another victory for United Nations operations. Resolution 435 helped establish the United Nations as a major peacekeeping power in the post-cold war era. “The UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), launched by the Security Council through Resolution 797 of December 16, 1992, was one of the most ambitious, multifaceted missions undertaken by the UN up to that time. Its mandate encompassed political, military, humanitarian, and electoral responsibilities not only for the pacification of a war-torn country but also for its transformation from a single-party state to a multiparty democracy.”⁵

Despite its great success in world peace, Security Council divisions have created several failures for the council. “More than any other conflict in the 1990s, the war in Bosnia and the UN’s handling of it helped shatter the optimism that characterized early debates about the likely impact of the end of the Cold War for the UN’s peace and security role.”⁶

³ Charter of the United Nations (1945).

⁴ Álvaro de Soto, “A Key United Nations Moment and Its Lessons,” *UN Chronicle*, online <http://unchronicle.un.org/article/key-united-nations-moment-and-its-lessons/>.

⁵ David Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the Twenty First Century* (2004), page 437.

⁶ *Ibidem*, page 463-464.

The Security Council cannot be comprehensively examined without a look at the its failings such as the genocide in Rwanda. Motivations for intervention were humanitarian; however it was considered a gray area in Security Council authority due to the insular and nebulous nature of the events. Some analysts have said it was a reflection of major powers unwillingness to spend money and take on the risks for a “trivial” matter. “By not asserting its role in the area of preventative diplomacy (Chapter VI), and by adopting a passive and contingent role in relation to security (Chapter VII), the Council failed in its promotional role in relation to the UN Charter as a whole.”⁷ Motivation to avoid the fracas that was Rwanda has pushed the Security Council to more immediate action in the years since; action was swifter and more decisive in Sierra Leone leading to a much larger degree of success. The success of the 15,000 member peacekeeping force can be seen in the successful 2002 elections.

Today the Security Council is involved with many ongoing disputes and potential crises. From implementing sanctions against Iran to bringing around ceasefires in Ukraine the Security Council is acting across the globe. Its mission is as essential today as it has ever been.

⁷ Ibidem, page 495.

Topic I: Combating Piracy on the High Seas

“Piracy is only one of many elements of what I call trans-national criminal activity because if you’re using the seaways for piracy, they’re probably being used for drug trafficking, human smuggling, and arms smuggling.”

-- Adm. Jonathan Greenert, American Chief of Naval Operations, 2011-2015

“It is because we are not engaged on the ground that we see so much threat on the seas.”

-- Joy Ache Angela Ogwu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, 2008-present

With ninety percent of international trade moving by sea, there are today more ships plying international waters than at any previous point; moreover, due to non-state actors, they are also more armed and dangerous than any time since the Second World War.⁸ Piracy is often overlooked as an isolated issue; however as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published: “Maritime crime represents a growing challenge for the international community. Offences (sic.) range from maritime piracy and the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean and other waters, to drug and arms trafficking, and charcoal smuggling in the Horn of Africa, the proceeds of which are financing the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.”⁹ This issue is, therefore, of paramount interest to this body. It is the goal of this background guide to offer two key stepping stones for this committee: (1) updates on several key hotspots of ocean-based piracy, and (2) a rough outline of the current United Nations action plan for combatting piracy. Delegates should feel free to research beyond the case studies and solutions provided.

Case Study: The Decline in Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean Piracy

The Gulf of Aden has offered an ideal environment for piracy and the Horn of Africa the ideal base for their operations. Since the collapse of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia — which occupies much of the region — has suffered from widespread violence, political anarchy, and a weak economy which is unable to generate sufficient alternative employment.¹⁰ In the last decade, a federal government has begun to coalesce the disparate feuding tribes. While as much as half of the nation remains totally outside of federal control (mostly under the

⁸ Ian Urbina, “Murder at Sea: Captured on Video, But Killers Go Free,” *The New York Times* (July 20, 2015).

⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Maritime Crime Programme: Annual Report 2015*, (United Nations, New York, 2015), page iii, <https://goo.gl/oOtqwA>.

¹⁰ Richard Weitz, *War and Governance: International Security in a Changing World Order* (Praeger, 2011), pp 148.

jurisdiction of Al-Shabaab or Somaliland), the United Nations has begun to refer to the region as a “fragile” state instead of a “failed” state.¹¹

In regards to piracy, Somalia gained its designation as a notorious hub during the latter half of the Somali Civil War (1991-2008). As the central government broke down, and both the domestic and international economy with it, many former fishermen began to hunt for valuable merchant vessels rather than fish. The United States led military interventions into the region under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II led to nothing but disaster. UNOSOM II resulted in the well known Battle of Mogadishu made notorious by the film *Black Hawk Down*.¹² As a result of the failure of international intervention, the rates and intensity of piracy continued to rapidly escalate until the early 2010s. In 2011 alone 47 merchant vessels were hijacked, and a further five times that number of hijackings were attempted.¹³ Ships as far as 200 nautical miles out from the horn are susceptible to attack.¹⁴

The logistics behind Somali piracy are unique. Until recently the pirates enjoyed almost universal support from local populations as they brought wealth into an otherwise poverty-stricken region. Locals would both feed and shelter pirate crews during the protracted negotiation process between hostage taking pirate crews and the individuals, companies, and nations being extorted.¹⁵ The economics are even more bizarre. Pirate crews have taken to gathering outside investors to supply them with arms and transport to take down merchant vessels. A recent report by Oceans Beyond Piracy estimated “that between \$339m and \$413m was paid in ransoms off the Somali coast between 2005 and 2012. The average haul was \$2.7m.”¹⁶ These huge payouts have prompted black market investors to finance voyages with the hope of hitting a jackpot.

The worst of the crisis seems to have passed however. In 2013 the economic impact of Somali piracy was half of the previous year and no merchant vessel was successfully hijacked.¹⁷ This precipitous decline can be attributed to several key factors coming together: domestic reform, international focus, and economic focus. Where there was no real Somali state to speak of during the civil war, the current coalition government has formed a moderate police and navel force to

¹¹ The Associated Press, “Somalia no longer a failed state, just a fragile one, says UN,” *The Guardian* (2015).

¹² Martin Murphy, “Dire Straits: Taking On Somali Pirates,” *World Affairs* 173, no. 2 (2010), page 90, <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.kennesaw.edu/stable/27870292>.

¹³ Christine Mungai, “How East African Piracy Ended, and Lessons West Africa Can Learn To End Crime on Its Waters,” *Mail and Guardian: Africa* (February 2015).

¹⁴ Douglas Guilfoyle, “Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts,” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2008), 690, <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.kennesaw.edu/stable/20488237>.

¹⁵ Oceans Beyond Piracy, “The State of Maritime Piracy 2015: Assessing the Economic and Human Cost.”

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ Mungai.

restore law and order to the region. Further, international efforts such as the 25 Members of Combined Task Force 150 have helped make the Horn of Africa one of the most heavily patrolled regions of the world. The Task Force is one of the great multilateral anti piracy measures undertaken in decades. Finally, like most instances of piracy, Somali piracy is primarily an economic activity.¹⁸ With the slow reintegration of Somalia into the global economy, it has become more profitable to remain in legitimate business. While these efforts are promising, the United Nations is swift to remind the world that “fragile” certainly does not mean stable — without continued international attention the situation could swiftly return to the chaos of the early 2000s.

Case Study: Resurgent Piracy in the Caribbean and South America

While international efforts like the Combined Task Force 150 have helped assuage the 2011 spike in piracy along the Horn of Africa; however the plunder gained at its high have spurred a revival of piracy in a region that has not seen significant levels in over 200 years — the Caribbean. International trade, already rich in the region, is boueyed by the presence of the Panama Canal and trading giants like the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil. The Pacific and Caribbean coast of Columbia and the Isle of Hispaniola are the main focuses of the region’s piracy.¹⁹ However specific incidences of piracy are taking place across the Caribbean region as a whole.

Merchant vessels plying these routes fall victim to one of two main forms of piracy. Larger more organized raids focus on seizing cargo to sell on the black market. Smaller parties board ships with the intent of simply grabbing small goods like electronics and what cash is kept on hand for payroll and harbor fees. A third variety has recently entered the mix, inspired by the tactics employed by the Somalis, pirates in the Caribbean have turned to kidnapping and ransoming hostages from personal yachts.²⁰ This trend is currently developing, and necessitates close attention to prevent it from growing. While international response has been slow to address this growing issue, regional powers have begun to work through the Counter-Piracy Contact Group (CPCG) to begin modernizing laws and enforcement on this developing issue.²¹ Member States such as Peru, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, who were inundated with piracy during the height of

¹⁸ Martin Murphy, page 95.

¹⁹ ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January—31 December 2015,” (United Kingdom, London, 2016), page 5.

²⁰ “Modern Day Pirate Attacks By Country,” *World Atlas*, <https://goo.gl/J7jKUb>.

²¹ The US Department of State, “Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Tom Kelly Travels to The Bahamas to Strengthen Cooperation on Counter-Piracy,” (Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC, July 5, 2013), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211552.htm>.

international piracy in 2011, have successfully rendered their combined actual and attempted piracy attacks to close to zero.²²


Case Study: The Blight of the Strait of Malacca and the Java and Banda Seas

The Indian Ocean, since the days of the Silk Road, has been a major conduit of international trade. Any merchant vessel hoping to make the lucrative journey from the People’s Republic of China to the Mediterranean Sea must pass through the Strait of Malacca. With close to a hundred thousand unique vessels carrying a full quarter of the world’s trade goods passing through yearly, the narrow 530 mile long strait is rightfully considered one of the most pivotal shipping lanes in the world.²³ Further the Banda and Java Seas offer additional piracy risk due to their extended isolated coastlines. Between January and December 2015, these combined regions were responsible for 187 attempted or successful acts of piracy.²⁴

Interestingly enough, while the lion’s share of the world’s piracy hotspots have been on the decline since the Combined Task Force 150 stormed the scene in 2011, piracy this region has by and large increased. Indonesia alone had 46 (in 2011), 81 (2012), 106 (2013), 100 (2014), and 108 (2015) attempted or successful attacks. Loyd’s of London, a London-based maritime insurer, added an additional one percent cost for all insured cargoes traveling through the strait.²⁵

A majority of the world’s pirates cite Indonesia as their country of origin. Part of this phenomenon is due to Indonesia’s lack of any sizable anti-piracy naval force to patrol it’s 55,000 mile coastline, pockmarked with isolated inlets and rivers. This problem is further exasperated by Indonesia and Malaysia’s unwillingness to work with a large international

CHART A: The following five locations recorded 71% attacks from a total of 246 reported attacks for the period.



²² “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January— 31 December 2015,” (United Kingdom, London, 2016), page 5.

²³ Donald B. Freeman, “The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet?” (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).

²⁴ “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January— 31 December 2015,” page 5.

²⁵ Simon Montlake, “Hard Times for Pirates in Busy World Waterways,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (October 30, 2006), <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1030/p01s04-woap.html>.

coalition — such as Combined Task Force 150 — to bring additional resources to bear. Despite the United Nations, the United States, and other powers applying pressure to bear on the region no action was taken. In 2005 Loyd’s of London quietly placed the region on its list of “war zone” regions. This elicited an immediate response.²⁶ A regional coalition of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore formed to help assuage this regional issue.²⁷ This group — the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) — conducts “coordinated naval and air patrols while facilitating the sharing of information between ships and the Monitoring and Action Agency (MAA).”²⁸ Naval forces from the three nations work under the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols (MSSP) and all three air forces launch joint patrols under the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS) initiative.²⁹ Piracy within the trade lanes of the Strait itself has dropped from 38 attacks in 2004 to only 1 in 2013. As a result Loyd’s of London dropped the area from the “war zone” list, though the one percent insurance hike still remains.³⁰ The efforts of the MSSP and the MAA are a brilliant but isolated effort as the Java and Banda Seas however remain a hotspot of piracy. The South China Sea, too, is on the rise. The International Chamber of Commerce explained that: “Incidents in Vietnam surged from seven in 2014 to twenty seven in 2015. The main cause is low-level theft against vessels anchored in Vietnam, with 15 reports from around the port of Vung Tau alone. In China four incidents were



²⁶ Anthony J. Masys, *Exploring the Security Landscape: Non-Traditional Security Challenges*, (Switzerland: Switzerland International Publishing, 2016), page 165.

²⁷ Patrick Winn, “The world has a new piracy hotspot,” *Global Post*, (March 27, 2014), <https://goo.gl/TeyHqS>.

²⁸ Oceans Beyond Piracy, “Malacca Strait Patrol,” <https://goo.gl/qOa9kf>.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Masys, page 165.

recorded in December 2015, the first in a long time.”³¹ It is clear that further action needs to be taken in this region, and that the Security Council may be able to productively involve itself.

Committee Directive

Piracy is a crime of opportunity which tends to thrive in the “choke points” of international trade: “There are several factors that encourage piracy, although their importance varies from place to place: lack of jurisdictional clarity, favorable geography, local conflict and disorder, inadequate security, cultural acceptance, and the promise of reward.”³² Piracy has bloomed in recent decades partially due to technology amplifying the threat small pirate gangs can offer: mortars, speedboats, assault rifles, GPS navigation, and more have padded out their armory. Decades of international complacency, too, have had their role in this wave of piracy. While in committee, delegates will represent the positions of their Member State towards the issue of piracy on the high seas. Delegates should familiarize themselves on the major hotspots of piracy, current efforts, lasting problems, and potential solutions. The solutions of the body should bring meaningful changes on a region-by-region basis rather than ineffective sweeping reforms. As a final note, here are some contemporary major action items for piracy being worked on by the United Nations: (1) encouraging international cooperation despite regional issues, (2) ensuring fair trials and proper sentencing for those who engage in piracy, (3) transitioning from simple enforcement to lasting preventative measures, (4) facilitating the sharing of information relating to piracy, (5) utilizing and enhancing existing NGOs and IOs, preventing pirates from registering their vessels with complicit Member States, and finally (7) investigating the role of technology in the modern resurgence of piracy. The seas of the world are, by international law, the property of both everyone and no one. The only acceptable jurisdiction over the high seas then is a truly international one, and international organization is better able to resolve this issue than the United Nations Security Council.

³¹ International Chamber of Commerce, “IMB: Maritime piracy hotspots persist worldwide despite reductions in key areas,” *Commercial Crimes Services*, <https://icc-ccs.org/news/1154-imb-maritime-piracy-hotspots-persist-worldwide-despite-reductions-in-key-areas>.

³² Martin Murphy, page 91.

Topic II: Addressing Potential Preventative Measures Against the Use of Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism

“When we're talking about technology that involves weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, there has to be an element of preemption.”

-- John E. Sununu, United States Senator, 2003-2009

“Bioterrorism is a real threat to our country. It's a threat to every nation that loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have them.... It's important that we confront these real threats to our country and prepare for future emergencies.”

-- George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States, 2001-2009

Introduction

Biological weapons are harmful biological agents used to disseminate disease-producing organisms during times of warfare.³³ Due to the growing knowledge of microorganisms today, genetic engineering has become the frontrunner used for the development of weapons. Pathogen characteristics that pose a larger threat as a consequence of this surge in knowledge are “survivability, infectivity, virulence, and drug resistance,” meaning that pathogens that already possess deadly potential are being modified to attack more forcefully and to be immune to modern day treatment.³⁴ There are five categories of biological agents that can be engineered for the purpose of warfare or bioterrorism: bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses, fungi, and toxins. Depending on specimen properties, some may be in favor over others. These properties include, but are not limited to, lethality, stability, and contagiousness of the specimen.³⁵

Rising global terrorism has raised concerns over such weapons falling into the hands of those who would carry out mass attacks on civilian populations. Incidents involving chemical weapons used by both governments and terrorists highlight the potential danger the world faces from biological ones. Despite the risks, biological weapons continue to be researched and produced.

History

While many people believe that biological warfare is a modern phenomenon, in reality it has been practiced for centuries. Scythian archers shot arrows covered in infected blood as far back as 400 BC.³⁶ Romans, Persians, and Greeks threw dead animals into wells and water sources to


³³ Thomas V. Inglesby, Tara O'Toole, and Donald A. Henderson, “Preventing the Use of Biological Weapons: Improving Response Should Prevention Fail,” *Oxford Journals*, <http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/6/926.full>

³⁴ Mackenzi Foley, “Genetically Engineered Bioweapons: A New Breed of Weapons for Modern Warfare.” *Applied Sciences*. <http://bit.ly/2eCcz5F>. (Accessed October 24, 2016).

³⁵ Barry R Schneider, “Biological Weapon,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/technology/biological-weapon>.

³⁶ EMedicineHealth, “Biological Warfare,” http://www.emedicinehealth.com/biological_warfare/article_em.htm.

infect local populations.³⁷ During the colonization of the New World, there were numerous occasions where blankets that had been infected with smallpox were given to Native Americans. Despite a deep lack of medical knowledge during these historical periods, military strategists had enough insight on pathology to attempt to use diseases that afflicted their own populations against enemies that were being faced in battle. Below is an image providing a timeline of some historical biological attacks.³⁸



The first prohibition of biological weapons can be found in the 1925 Geneva Protocol during the era of the League of Nations.³⁹ For those leaders, soldiers, and civilians who survived the brutal chemical and biological attacks of World War I (WWI), the horrors of their side effects resulted in a global desire to prevent these kinds of weapons from ever being used again. An excerpt from the protocol is included below:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;

Declare:

That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Block, Steven, “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons,” *American Scientist*, January-February 2001, <http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/feature/the-growing-threat-of-biological-weapons/3>.

³⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries,” <https://goo.gl/bGm8te>.

methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.⁴⁰

Despite most developed nations signing the 1925 Geneva Protocol, World War II (WWII) saw continued development and use of biological weapons, especially by Japan.⁴¹ But other Member States such as the United States of America (USA) and Great Britain also studied and created biological agents, supposedly only for retaliation if Germany used such weapons first.⁴²

While the League of Nations ultimately failed, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other treaties survived to become the Geneva Conventions that the public is familiar with today. However, one of the limitations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol was that it did not call for the disarmament of biological weapons that a Member State may already possess at the time of joining the treaty, nor did it prohibit governments from researching and developing new ones. This dilemma was addressed with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, or Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) for short.⁴³ The BWC stated very clearly in Article I:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.⁴⁴

Since the treaty went into effect on March 26, 1975, there have been several review conferences that have modified the BWC.⁴⁵ One of the crowning achievements of the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 was the creation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) which provides assistance in complying with the BWC.⁴⁶ Both the 1925 Geneva Convention and the BWC lacked oversight to ensure signatories were staying true to the treaty. An example of this failing came when the Russian government admitted in 1991 that it had not destroyed its stockpiles of biological weapons despite signing the BWC in 1972.

Modern Day Threats

While the fall of the Soviet Union prompted the end of the extensive arms race — which included biological weapons — between the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

⁴¹ Barry R Schneider, “Biological Weapon,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/technology/biological-weapon>.

⁴² EMedicineHealth, “Biological Warfare,” http://www.emedicinehealth.com/biological_warfare/article_em.htm.

⁴³ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “Biological Weapons,” <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/>.

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

AGENT	TYPE ¹	WEAPON- IZED	WATER- THREAT	STABLE IN WATER	INFECTIOUS DOSE ²	CHLORINE TOLERANCE ³
Anthrax	B	Yes	Yes	2 yrs spore	6,000	Spores resistant
Brucellosis	B	Yes	Probable	20-72 days	10,000	Unknown
<i>C. Perfringens</i>	B	Probable	Probable	Common in sewage	~500,000	Resistant
Tularemia	B	Yes	Yes	< 90 days	25	Inactivated, 1 ppm, 5 min
Shigellosis	B	Unknown	Yes	2-3 days	10,000	Inactivated, 0.05 ppm, 10min
Cholera	B	Unknown	Yes	“Survives well”	1,000	“Easily killed”
Salmonella	B	Unknown	Yes	8 days, fresh water	10,000	Inactivated
Plague	B	Probable	Yes	16 days	500	Unknown
Q Fever	R	Yes	Possible	Unknown	25	Unknown
Variola	V	Possible	Possible	Unknown	10	Unknown
Hepatitis A	V	Unknown	Yes	Unknown	30	Inactivated, 0.4 ppm, 30 min
Crypto- sporidiosis	P	Unknown	Yes	Stable days or more	130	Oocysts resistant

USA, there are many nation-states today that have obtained deadly agents through their own research and development as technology has improved globally. The countries in green below have either known or suspected biological and/or chemical weapons.⁴⁷ While the recent attacks in Syria have been chemical as opposed to biological, they represent the potential for stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to fall into enemy or even civilian hands. Agents that are available today can be seen on the next page.⁴⁸

As one can see, some specimen can survive in water supplies for days or years due to their anatomical capabilities, meaning that an accidental or intentional spill could go undetected until after thousands of people had been exposed and/or infected by the specimen.

It should also be noted that it does not take an overwhelming amount of resources, either financial or scientific, to manufacture and make use of these weapons. For example, anthrax’s “ubiquitous presence in soil and the simplicity of culturing it make anthrax readily available to armies and to terrorists.”⁴⁹ Nuclear weapons, while a significant cause for concern, are difficult to come by and require technical knowledge as well as a military-style delivery system such as a

⁴⁷ CNN, “Biological and Chemical Weapons,” <http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/biochem.weapons/>.

⁴⁸ Maj. Donald C. Hickman (USAF), “A Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water Systems At Risk,” *USAF Counterproliferation Center*, September 1999, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/hickman.htm>.

⁴⁹ Theodore J. Cieslak *et al.* “Immunization Against Potential Biological Warfare Agents,” *Oxford Journals* 30, no. 6 (1999): 843-850, <http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/6/843.full#abstract-1>.

missile or bomb. It would be much more difficult to mail a nuclear bomb to someone than it was for Dr. Bruce Ivins to mail anthrax.⁵⁰ Modern technology puts both the agents and dispersal devices within easy grasp of both state and non-state actors.

Technology-Based Warfare

As technology continues to advance, so to do means to produce, spread, and also counter biological agents. However, recent advances have favored the creation and use of these weapons as opposed to stopping them. One of the undeniable challenges in preventing attacks is the numerous means available to carry one out. Once mass produced, a bioweapon can be spread through aerosols, food, or water supplies depending on the nature of the pathogen. A recent barrier surpassed by scientist was bacterial and viral DNA synthesizing. This process allows the creation of novel pathogens. Furthermore, the four-letter code of DNA - (A) adenine, (C) cytosine, (G) guanine, and (T) thymine - has been translated to binary code making genetic manipulation electronically based, therefore reducing its overall cost to produce. Other advances have been made to target specific mechanisms of a cell; examples include gene therapy, stealth viruses, and binary fission. An increase in microorganism knowledge and accessibility to biological tools partnered with a lack of government regulations could result in future non-military related bio-threats.⁵¹

There are two manners in which a bio weapon could be introduced to the masses: overt and covert. Overt occurs when the bioweapon is introduced and its origin is known due to its announcement, such as a threat sent to the media or an impending attack from a nation at war. A covert attack, on the other hand, comes without warning except from minor side effects seen in the population prior to full-blown infection. Typically, the presence of such a weapon is unknown to the government. In either case, once the threat is known an immediate response from organizations such as Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), and local food and water regulation agencies is required to aid the central government's law enforcement to evaluate the threat. The health sector informs the government of such a presence after an abundance of patients display unusual symptoms. Once law enforcement is aware of the pressing issue, they become responsible for the criminal investigation so as to find the cause of the attack and prevent future incidents. Having technology within the public capable of endangering a multitude of lives is a global risk that must be taken seriously. In any threat or hoax, the event must be treated as if it were real and victims thoroughly analyzed for exposure.⁵² Analysis for biological related weapons is dependent

⁵⁰ NPR, "Timeline: How The Anthrax Terror Unfolded," <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded>.

⁵¹ Mackenzi Foley, "Genetically Engineered Bioweapons: A New Breed of Weapons for Modern Warfare," *Applied Sciences*, <http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/2013/03/genetically-engineered-bioWeapons-a-new-breed-of-weapons-for-modern-warfare/#.WA6IW2WYfR0>.

⁵² "Testimony by J.T. Caruso to the Senate," <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/bioterrorism>.

on technology in hospital labs which can be time consuming, closing the window of opportunity to potentially save lives. Nonetheless, they are essential for proper analysis of the specimen.⁵³

Sovereign States Vs. Terrorist Organizations

One of the most difficult threats this body faces is dealing with terrorism. Unlike Member States who have sovereignty and must abide by the numerous treaties they have signed such as the Geneva Conventions, terrorists have no international authority governing their actions. There have been numerous instances of individuals or groups carrying out biological attacks, including the aforementioned Dr. Bruce Ivins anthrax attacks, Ma Anand Sheela's salmonella poisoning in The Dalles, Oregon, and the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attempting to carry out anthrax attacks before using sarin gas in a Tokyo subway.⁵⁴ While these specific attacks resulted in few deaths, they highlight the vulnerabilities that every country around the world has to bio weapon incidents.

Another issue that arises from the unstable nature of terrorist groups is indiscriminate killings. While most Member States would not release a toxin on their own troops and/or population, extremists care very little for civilian casualties. In fact, many religious extremists consider it an honor to die in the name of their cause, and would sacrifice themselves to deliver a biological weapon to a military or state target. Not only would mass casualties be acceptable to extremists, in some cases it is the goal of the attack itself, whereas a nation would use biological weapons for a military purpose. Securing agents that are currently in areas of conflict, such as Syria, should be a top priority.

Conclusion

Biological agents represent a growing threat to people around the world. There are many viruses and bacterial infections that modern medicine cannot treat and could, if spread effectively, kill a significant portion of the population. The BWC bans signatories from creating "microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes," with the key being "peaceful purposes."⁵⁵ Member States can still do research and create new WMDs so long as they can justify the work as being in the name of peace. Also, the delivery devices mentioned in part (2) are difficult to regulate because, for example, a missile can be fitted with an explosive warhead or a biological warhead.⁵⁶ One should also bear in mind that biological weapons have the same "mutually assured destruction" element that nuclear weapons do. If an

⁵³ Margaret A. Hamburg, "Preparing for and Preventing Bioterrorism," *Issues in Science and Technology*, http://issues.org/18-2/p_hamburg/.

⁵⁴ Steven Block, "The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons," *American Scientist*, January-February 2001, <http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/feature/the-growing-threat-of-biological-weapons/3>.

⁵⁵ UNODA, "Biological Weapons," <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/>.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

attack were to occur in the instance of one sovereign entity against another, retaliation would likely occur, resulting in thousands or millions of deaths. An attack by a terrorist organization is much more difficult to both anticipate and respond to afterwards.

In light of recent global attention given to this danger, some measures have been taken. In the USA, enough smallpox vaccine has been created to vaccinate the entire population in the event of an attack.⁵⁷ They also possess anthrax vaccines as well as many others. However, some vaccines can only work prior to infection, and others must be administered within days of exposure.⁵⁸ Modifying the strain of a particular agent can also make current vaccinations ineffective and would require entire new batches of vaccine that would take time and resources to create. Another problem is that developing nations do not have these vast stores nor the medical facilities to properly attend to a large-scale attack.

Committee Directive

While in committee, delegates will represent the positions of their Member States in regards to biological weapons. Delegates should familiarize themselves with fundamental mandates as well as current actions of the BWC's Seventh Review Board. In developing goals and objectives to pursue during committee, delegates must remain within the established positions of their respective Member State. There should also be an emphasis on creating strategies that are multi-tiered and address not only the immediate threats faced by biological weapons and terrorism, but also take into account any potential subsequent effects simultaneously. As a final note, it is vital that your delegation knows the policies of your respective Member State and also knows how your Member State is working to enhance their policies on an international scale.

⁵⁷ The History of Vaccines, "Biological Weapons, Bioterrorism, and Vaccines," <http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/biological-weapons-bioterrorism-and-vaccines>.

⁵⁸ Ibidem.

Security Council Rules Addendum

Rule One: Voting and the Veto

All votes (both procedural and substantive) in the Security Council require 9 affirmative votes to pass, as outlined in the UN Charter. For instance, a vote of 8 in favor, with 0 opposed and 7 abstentions would fail. Substantive votes (resolutions, amendments and second vote of division of question) additionally require the “concurring votes” of the permanent 5 (P-5) members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK and US). The UN interprets that an abstention by a member of the P-5 does not represent a veto. Therefore, for a resolution to pass, all members of the P-5 must either vote yes or abstain, and the resolution must receive 9 affirmative votes. Note that the P-5 have made only limited usage of the “veto” in the past 8 years. Only 13 vetoes have been cast in that time, and in 1996, 1998 and 2000, no vetoes were cast. The Republic of France and the United Kingdom have not used their veto in decades.

Rule Two: Voting with Rights and Passing

During a role call vote once the Dais calls upon a delegate they may choose from the following options: yes, no, abstain, yes with rights, no with rights, or pass. Yes simply casts a vote in favor of a draft resolution, and no simply casts a vote against it. Abstentions count as neither and may only be made if a nation was recorded as “present” not “present and voting” at the most recent attendance. Yes and no with rights allow a nation to make a brief explanation of why they voted the way they did once called upon by the Dais after voting procedure is finished. The chair may limit the time permitted for this explanation. Finally, passing permits the Member State to be “skipped” in order to hear the remaining votes, and once these are done the Dais will return to those who passed. Member States who pass may not abstain or vote with rights.

Rule Three: Make the Matter Substantive

At this conference the Dais will recognize the right of Member States to ask for procedural matters to be placed under the rules for substantive votes — and thus affected by the “veto” power. Though this is a “motion,” it will be treated as if it was a “point.” When it comes time to vote on a procedural matter that a Member State wishes to make substantive, *before* the Dais calls for votes that Member State should stand and motion to Make the Matter Substantive. The Dais will accept or rule the motion dilatory. If it is accepted, there will be simple majority substantive vote of the body to keep the motion procedural. If that fails or is vetoed the original issue will be voted on as if it was a substantive matter.

Rule Four: Suspension of the Rules

Suspension of the Rules allows for an informal presentation. This can be used for a draft resolution to be introduced, an expert to offer testimony, or a number of other actions. To motion for this a Member State should ask for a Suspension of the Rules for the purposes of a(n) _____ for __ minutes. This may be passed with a simple majority.

Rule Five: Outside Parties

The UN Charter gives the Security Council the option to invite non-Member States of the Security Council to participate without vote in discussions that affect the non-Member States. At this conference a formal request should be made to the Dais asking for an expert on a specific field. If enough of the body concurs, an expert will join the committee for a finite time.

Rule Six: Yielding Time

Like the rest of the conference this body does not recognize the yielding of time to the chair; however the Dais will permit the yielding of up to 75% of a delegate's time to another delegate. This is to facilitate direct questions or allow explanations from Member States further down the Speaker's List.